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CHILD ABUSE AS SLAVERY:
A THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT RESPONSE TO
DESHANEY
Akdzil Reed Amar* and Daniel Widawsky"
Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
U.S. CONSTITUTION'
The Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution is a "grand yet
simple declaration of the personal freedom of all the human race
within the jurisdiction of this government. '2 In a single stroke, the
Amendment outlawed the "peculiar institution" of southern chattel
slavery - auction blocks, overseers, iron chains, and all. Yet the
Amendment is more than a mere nineteenth-century relic, written
only to reform a "peculiar" time and place. Its framers' disgust with
"the peculiar institution" led them to announce a more universal,
transcendent norm: slavery, of all forms and in all places, shall not
exist. Emancipation did not discriminate by age; the Amendment
freed minors as well as adults. Nor did the Amendment discriminate
on the basis of familial status; many slaves in 1865 were mulattoes
fathered by white slavemasters, yet they were also plainly protected.
The Amendment embraced not only those slaves with some African
ancestry, but all persons, whatever their race or national origin. Its
sweeping words and vision prohibited not only forced labor for the
master's economic enrichment, but all forms of chattel slavery -
whether the ultimate motive for such domination, degradation, and
dehumanization was greed (as in the cotton market) or sadism (as at
the end of a lash). Finally, the Amendment compelled abolition of
even "private" enslavement perpetuated not by the force of law, but
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by the violence of master over slave. The de facto condition of
slavery, the Amendment commanded, shall not exist in America.
Therefore, as we shall show in greater detail below, the Thirteenth
Amendment in both letter and spirit extends its affirmative protection
to a slave even if. (i) the slave is a child, (2) the slave child is the
offspring of the master, (3) the slave child has no African roots, (4)
the slave child is not used to maximize the master's financial profit,
and (5) the child's enslavement is de facto, and not de jure. One such
slave child was Joshua DeShaney.
In Part I of this Commentary, we introduce the reader to Joshua
DeShaney and the Supreme Court opinions that grew out of the child
abuse he suffered. In subsequent Parts, we argue that the Thirteenth
Amendment creates dramatic remedial opportunities for Joshua and
others like him. The idea that the Thirteenth Amendment might
apply to child abuse will no doubt strike many readers as novel, if
not farfetched. We ask these readers for patience and remind them
that, for example, only a generation ago, the ideas that abortion and
pornography implicate equality rights for women - ideas now widely
held - were seen by many as similarly novel and farfetched. By the
end of this Commentary, we hope to establish that the plight of Joshua
DeShaney implicates the core concerns of the Thirteenth Amendment,
and that the Amendment speaks to the horror of child abuse with
remarkable directness. Indeed, we believe that this Amendment -
and not the doctrine of substantive due process - provides the best
constitutional vehicle to conceptualize and characterize cases like Josh-
ua's.
I. JOSHUA AND THE SUPREME COURT
A. Substantive Due Process
In DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Ser-
vices, 3 the Rehnquist Court held that the state of Wisconsin had no
constitutional duty under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to protect a young child from his father's physical abuse.
The facts of the case were heart-wrenching. 4 In his first five years of
life, Joshua DeShaney endured repeated beatings at the hands of his
father, and thereby suffered severe brain damage. During these years,
Joshua remained in his father's custody even though Wisconsin's Win-
nebago County Department of Social Services (DSS) had strong reason
to believe that Joshua was the victim of serious abuse. In January of
1983, after being admitted to a local hospital for multiple wounds,
3 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
4 See id. at 191-94; id. at 208-09 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Joshua was temporarily removed from his father's custody, but a
Wisconsin juvenile court soon returned the child to his father. During
the course of monthly visits throughout I983, a DSS caseworker meth-
odically observed and recorded many signs of Joshua's victimization
but took no further action to protect the child. In both February and
November of 1983, a local emergency room contacted DSS to report
that Joshua had been treated yet again for injuries believed to have
been caused by child abuse. On both occasions the caseworker chose
to take no action to remove Joshua from his father's custody. In
March of 1984, a few weeks before his fifth birthday, Joshua suffered
a final and savage beating. His subsequent hospitalization revealed a
history of traumatic head injuries, leading doctors to conclude that
Joshua would have to spend the rest of his life in an institution for
the profoundly retarded. Joshua and his biological mother then
brought suit against DSS and other local officials for their failure to
remove Joshua from his father's custody in the face of repeated evi-
dence of physical abuse.
Ruling that the Due Process Clause does not require a state "to
protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens against invasion
by private actors," 5 the Supreme Court denied Joshua's constitutional
claim. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, sharply
distinguished Joshua's case from Youngberg v. Romeo, 6 a case in which
the mother of a man who had been institutionalized by Pennsylvania
successfully brought a due process claim against the state7 for its
failure to protect its ward from injury. Romeo, said the DeShaney
Court, stood only for the proposition that:
[W]hen the State takes a person into its custody and holds him there
against his will, the Constitution imposes upon it a corresponding duty
to assune some responsibility for his safety and general well-being
.... [The state may not] by the affirmative exercise of its power so
restrain[] an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to care for
himself, and at the same time fail[] to provide for his basic human
needs - e.g., food, clothing, shelter, medical care, and reasonable
safety .... 8
Taken at face value, this language actually calls into question the
Court's result in DeShaney. One could easily argue that the state of
5 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195.
6 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
7 Following the usage in DeShaney, we shall simply refer to suits against state agents and
subdivisions as suits against "the state." See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 194-203. We therefore
ignore for present purposes important differences among these suits as to deterrence effect,
economic incidence, legal liability, and governmental immunity - differences that one of us
has analyzed in greater detail elsewhere. See Akhil R. Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism,
96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1466-92, 1504-19 (1987).
8 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
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Wisconsin, "by the affirmative exercise of its power," did in fact
"restrain" Joshua's "liberty" while "failing to provide for his basic
human need[]" for "reasonable safety." After all, Wisconsin's family
law affirmatively gave father Randy DeShaney a legal right to physical
custody over Joshua.9 As Justice Brennan observed in his dissent in
DeShaney, "Wisconsin . ., effectively confined Joshua DeShaney
within the walls of Randy DeShaney's violent home until such time
as DSS took action to remove him."1 0 If Joshua had fled the home
of his abusive father - with the help, let us say, of his mother (who
had been stripped of custody when Joshua was an infant) - the local
or state police stood ready to capture and return Joshua to his father's
custody. In fact, a Wisconsin juvenile court had temporary custody
over Joshua in January 1983 and affirmatively returned him to his
father's care.
The Supreme Court, in an aside, acknowledged that the case might
have been different if DSS had placed Joshua in an abusive foster
home." However, the distinction between biological parents and fos-
ter parents is dubious because in both situations, the state, through
its family law, chooses who shall have legal custody over a ward.
Biology is not destiny; a biological parent's custody over his offspring
is not merely "natural" and prepolitical. Rather, like property, custody
is a legal concept, shaped and enforced by the state. For example, a
biological father of a child whose mother is legally married to another
man at the time of the child's conception and birth is typically not
recognized as the legal father with legal rights of custody.' 2 Never-
9 See David A. Strauss, Due Process, Government Inaction, and Private Wrongs, 1989 Sup.
CT. REV. 53, 65-66; cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (holding
that judicial enforcement of the common law of libel is state action).
10 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 210 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Like Professor Strauss, see supra
note 9, we go beyond Justice Brennan in emphasizing the hidden hand of the state not merely
in establishing the DSS, but, more fundamentally, in creating a legal regime of parental custody.
11 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 2ox n.9.
12 Cf. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 11o, 127 (1989) (holding that a mere biological
connection between a father and a child "is not the stuff of which fundamental rights ... are
made"); Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 261 (1983) (holding that the "mere existence of a
biological link" between a natural parent and child does not trigger "substantial protection under
the Due Process Clause"); id. at 260 ("'Parental rights do not spring full-blown from the biological
connection between parent and child."' (emphasis deleted) (quoting Caban v. Mohammed, 441
U.S. 380, 397 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting))). In our view, as long as the state acts through
general and prospective legislation, it has considerable authority to change custody rules, either
in favor of or away from biological parents - to make matters simple, assume a law that
would not reallocate custody for any lives in being, including lives in utero. As we shall develop
below, however, the state's custody regime must, as a constitutional matter, be plausibly in the
child's interest. See infra pp. 1373-78 (arguing that restrictions on parental custody are appli-
cable to all families). Although other constitutional constraints may also exist, we shall not
attempt to analyze them here.
Of course, once a general custody regime is in place, any state attempt to deprive an
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theless, the Court concluded that the state of Wisconsin bore no
responsibility for Joshua's confinement to the custody of his father:
"While the State may have been aware of the dangers that Joshua
faced in the free world, it played no part in their creation, nor did it
do anything to render him any more vulnerable to them." 13
The Court's narrow application of Youngberg reflected its obvious
concerns about "substantive due process" and "affirmative" rights.
The Court took pains to point out that Joshua's claim triggered "the
substantive rather than the procedural component of the Due Process
Clause; petitioners do not claim that the state denied Joshua protection
without according him appropriate procedural safeguards, but that it
was categorically obligated to protect him in these circumstances. "14
The Court was clearly suspicious of any such "categorical" obligation
to "protect." If, under the Due Process Clause, the government were
responsible for every private wrong, an unending parade of horribles
of government liability might be unleashed: victims of crime would
sue the government for inadequate police services; victims of fire
would sue the government for inadequate fire services; victims of
poverty would sue the government for inadequate social services; and
so on. Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit in DeShaney,
expressed this anxiety when he wrote: "The state does not have a duty
enforceable by the federal courts to maintain a police force or a fire
department, or to protect children from their parents. " 15 Thus, de-
spite the extent of state action in Joshua's case, the Supreme Court,
closely following Judge Posner, refused to cognize Joshua's substantive
due process claim.
B. The Thirteenth Amendment:
A Preliminary Analysis
Joshua's attorneys did not assert a Thirteenth Amendment claim.
But Justice Blackmun, in his passionate dissent in DeShaney, set the
stage for such a claim when he compared the majority in DeShaney
to "the antebellum judges who denied relief to fugitive slaves. '16 The
analogy between antebellum slavery and child abuse - an analogy
that Justice Blackmun's provocative language invites but does not
develop - seems both striking and fruitful. Consider the following
preliminary analysis.
individual guardian of custody would implicate due process concerns, as would any state attempt
to deprive an individual of other legal rights.
13 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 201.
14 Id. at 195 (citation omitted).
Is DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 812 F.2d 298, 301 (7th Cir. 1997).
16 DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 212 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Like an antebellum slave, an abused child is subject to near total
domination and degradation by another person, and is treated more
as a possession than as a person. Unless the state acts to protect an
abused child, the child's status bears an eerie resemblance to that of
a pre-Civil War American slave. For example, if a child runs away,
the state typically returns her to parental custody, just as antebellum
judges returned fugitive slaves to their masters. And just as antebel-
lum states enforced the legal rights of masters to physical control over
their slaves, today's states continue to enforce the legal rights of
parents to physical control over their children.
To be sure, it is unhelpful to conceptualize all children as slaves,
for this conceptualization would imply that there is no difference
between a free child and a slave child. But it would be equally
unhelpful to categorically exempt all children from Thirteenth Amend-
ment scrutiny, for that exemption, too, obscures the key difference
between a free child and a slave child. Although virtually all children
are in some form of parental "custody," custody alone should not be
confused with slavery, at least when children are involved. Under
ordinary circumstances, parental custody does not violate the Thir-
teenth Amendment because, it is presumed, the parent exercises con-
trol over the child in the interests of that child. But when a parent
perverts this coercive authority by systematically abusing and degrad-
ing his ward - treating his child not as a person but as a chattel,
acting as if he had title over the child rather than a trusteeship on
behalf of the child - the parent violates the Thirteenth Amendment
and should be subject to suit.
Whereas the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state conduct,
the Thirteenth applies to private conduct as well. The absence of a
"state action" trigger in the Thirteenth Amendment does more than
just allow the slave to bring suit against the private master; the
Amendment's broad mandatory language that slavery "shall [not] ex-
ist" commands the state to affirmatively protect the child once it knows
of concrete, identifiable, de facto slavery within its borders. To carry
out this obligation, the state must enact and actively enforce child
abuse laws within its jurisdiction. Thus, the Amendment prohibits
both private action and state inaction whenever the state is aware of
private slavery. 17
17 Even if this state inaction theory were rejected, however, Joshua still should have prevailed
on the facts of DeShaney. Because the state of Wisconsin stood behind Randy's custody over
Joshua, the Thirteenth Amendment required the state to eliminate any de facto slavery that
took place under the color of state custody law. In other words, there is state action in cases
of parental child abuse if we look carefully - the state acts by erecting and enforcing a child's
servitude to his parents. Both the broad (state inaction) and the narrow (state custody) theories
of the Thirteenth Amendment explain why a damage suit, in Joshua's case, properly lay against
Wisconsin rather than against, for instance, Alaska or the United States.
A Wyoming court originally awarded custody to Joshua's father pursuant to a divorce decree.
Subsequently, his father moved to Wisconsin, which continued to enforce the custody rights.
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The state's affirmative obligation under the Amendment, however,
would not unleash the parade of liability that troubled the DeShaney
Court. Unlike a potentially unbounded substantive due process claim,
a Thirteenth Amendment claim would not expose the state to liability
for every private wrong. Under the Thirteenth Amendment, a state
has an obligation only in concrete, identifiable cases of slavery or
involuntary servitude - not in every case involving liberty or prop-
erty.
Preliminarily, then, the Thirteenth Amendment lens appears to be
a powerful tool that enables us to see DeShaney in a new light. More
careful study of the Amendment confirms and deepens the foregoing
analysis.
II. A CLOSER LOOK AT THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT:
CHILD ABUSE AS SLAVERY
In i865, We the People of the United States, via the Thirteenth
Amendment, declared that slavery must stop. Most immediately, the
Amendment targeted the system of chattel slavery entrenched in the
so-called confederate and border states - a complex web of laws,
customs, practices, and attitudes euphemistically referred to as "the
peculiar institution." But the Amendment's sweeping words and un-
derlying vision are more universal, outlawing slavery of all forms and
in all places.
But what, precisely, is "slavery"? For our purposes a good work-
ing definition of "slavery"'8 is: "A power relation of domination, deg-
radation, and subservience, in which human beings are treated as
chattel, not persons." Implicit in this definition is a rejection of the
idea that "slavery" depends necessarily on adulthood, biological oth-
erness, race, forced labor, or state action. In other words, a person
can be a Thirteenth Amendment "slave" whether or not she is a minor;
whether or not the "master" is a blood relation of the "slave"; whether
or not she has African roots; whether or not the enslavement takes
the form of forced "labor"; and whether or not the enslavement is
officially sanctioned by state law. Insofar as a child like Joshua is
treated as chattel and subjected (legally or illegally) to domination and
degradation by a parent, such a child - of any race - is guaranteed
There is no indication from the record that Wyoming or the United States government had any
knowledge of his father's propensity for violence against Joshua.
Is It would be difficult to offer a comprehensive definition of "slavery" suitable for all
purposes (philosophical, historical, linguistic, and so on) - perhaps as difficult as fashioning an
all-purpose definition of the equally vital but elusive concept of "freedom." Our task here,
however, is more limited, for we seek a definition of "slavery" within the meaning of § i of the
Thirteenth Amendment, a working definition suitable for judges and exemplified (though not




protection by both the literal terms and the underlying vision of the
Thirteenth Amendment. Legislative history, judicial precedent, and
slave narratives all support this broad reading of the Amendment's
letter and spirit.
A. Legislative History
The history of the Amendment makes clear that slavery was under-
stood as intimately connected with issues of family servitude. Critics
of slavery in the mid-nineteenth century repeatedly linked the "pecu-
liar institution" with polygamy. For example, the Republican Plat-
form of 1856 declared that "it is both the right and the imperative
duty of Congress to prohibit in the Territories those twin relics of
barbarism - Polygamy, and Slavery."19 In a famous speech before
the Senate on the admission of Kansas to the Union, Republican
Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts refined the analogy:
By license of Polygamy, one man may have many wives, all bound
to him by marriage-tie, and in other respects protected by law. By
license of Slavery, a whole race is delivered over to prostitution and
concubinage, without the protection of any law. Surely, Sir, is not
Slavery barbarous? 20
The analogy between slavery and polygamy was neither casual
nor merely an expedient political slogan designed to forge an alliance
between anti-slavery and anti-Mormon voters. Rather, the analogy
was a deep, almost literal, equation. Slavery in the antebellum South
was itself a polygamy of sorts. As popular abolitionist tracts empha-
sized in graphic - almost lurid - terms, slavery gave white masters
free sexual access to a virtual harem of black women slaves2 1 -
"concubines," in Sumner's pointed language. Indeed, in an earlier
speech on Kansas, Sumner had suggested, in quite provocative double
entendres, that "slavery" was the "mistress" of the southern white
man, and in particular, the "mistress" of Senator Andrew Butler of
South Carolina. 22
19 NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 1840-1972, at 27 (Donald B. Johnson & Kirk H. Porter
eds., 1973).
20 Senator Charles Sumner, The Barbarism of Slavery, Speech in the United States Senate
on the Admission of Kansas as a Free State (June 4, i86o), in 5 THE WORKS OF CHARLES
SUMNER I, 2, (1872).
21 On white men's sexual access to slave women, see JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B.
FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA 93-io4 (1988); and
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL 413-31 (1976). On abolitionist literature con-
cerning this topic, see D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra, at ioi.
22 See Senator Charles Sumner, The Crime Against Kansas, Speech in the United States
Senate (May i9-2o, 1856), in 4 THE WORKS OF CHARLES SUMNER 125, 144 (187).
The implication that Senator Butler was sleeping with slaves was lost on no one, and within
days led Butler's young cousin, Congressman Preston Brooks, to cane the defenseless Sumner
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This system of "polygamous concubinage," which linked white
masters with black slaves, generated a large number of mulatto off-
spring who were treated as slaves by their biological fathers. In the
striking words of southern diarist Mary Boykin Chesnut, "[1]ike the
patriarchs of old, our men live all in one house with their wives and
their concubines; and the mulattoes one sees in every family partly
resemble the white children." 23 Thus, the relationship between master
and slave in many cases was quite literally a relationship between
biological father and child. During the debates over the passage of
the Thirteenth Amendment, various Democratic defenders of slavery
analogized the relationship between master and slave to that of parent
and child. As one opponent of the Amendment recognized:
The domestic institution of slavery is one of these [social and domestic]
relations, and was recognized in the States of this Confederation as a
species of proprietary interest. The Constitution describes slaves, and
I suppose children and apprentices might come under the same class
as persons bound to service. 24
In the words of another supporter of slavery:
The parent has the right to the service of his child; he has a property
in the service of that child. A husband has a right of property in the
service of his wife; he has the right to the management of his house-
hold affairs. The master has a right of property in the service of his
apprentice. All these rights rest upon the same basis as a man's right
of property in the service of slaves. 25
Similarly, Republican Congressman Samuel Shellabarger of Ohio
noted in passing the analogy between "parents" and "masters. '26 In
1865, Democratic Congressman James Brown of Wisconsin proposed
an alternative Thirteenth Amendment, which, among other things,
would have created a sweeping exception to the ban on involuntary
servitude for all "relations of parent and child, master and apprentice,
guardian and ward. '27 Neither his general alternative amendment
nor his specific textual exception was accepted by the Reconstruction
Congress.
Thus, both supporters and opponents of slavery understood that
the "peculiar institution" was tightly bound up with private and inti-
mate relations between persons linked by sex and blood. Although
into bloody unconsciousness while Sumner was seated at his desk on the floor of the Senate.
See id. at 257.
23 GENOVESE, supra note 21, at 426 (quoting MARY B. CHESNUT, A DIARY FROM DIXIE
21-22 (Ben A. Williams ed., 1949)).
24 CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., ist Sess. 2941 (x864) (statement of Rep. Fernando Wood).
25 CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 215 (I865) (statement of Rep. Chilton White).
26 See CONG. GLOBE, 3 7th Cong., 2d Sess. 1636 (1862).
27 CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 528 (i865).
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such relations were centuries old, the Thirteenth Amendment broke
sharply with custom insofar as custom condoned the condition of
slavery. As one legislator noted, antiquity cannot justify a practice
because antiquity, at one point, also practiced polygamy and canni-
balism. 28 To end slavery was thus to radically restructure this "pri-
vate" sphere, and to reorder not simply the political and economic
system but the social fabric as well. Accordingly, unlike virtually
every earlier provision of the Constitution, the Thirteenth Amendment
contained no state action requirement.
B. Judicial Interpretation
i. Supreme Court Precedent. - When it first considered the Thir-
teenth Amendment in the Slaughter-House Cases,29 the Court noted
that the Amendment protects a class broader than African slaves:
"[W]hile negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which
proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery,
now or hereafter."30 The Court concluded that judges must look to
the "pervading spirit" of the Civil War amendments when interpreting
the terms "slavery" and "involuntary servitude."31
The "pervading spirit" of the Thirteenth Amendment, as the Court
explained a decade later, prohibits not only state action, but private
action as well - private action either in conformity with or in vio-
lation of law. Thus, in the Civil Rights Cases,32 the Court declared
that "the Amendment is not a mere prohibition of state laws estab-
lishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration that slavery
or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United
States."33 When one person enslaves another - whether or not the
slavery is backed by the state - the Thirteenth Amendment's sweep-
ing command that slavery "shall [not] exist" is violated. This basic
28 See CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., Ist Sess. 1438 (1864) (statement of Sen. James Harlan).
29 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
30 The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72; see also United States v. Rhodes,
27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. I866) (No. 16,151) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment
"throws its protection over everyone, of every race, color, and condition"). These pronounce-
ments resonate with the emphatic understanding of the Reconstruction Congress, the members
of which repeatedly emphasized that the Thirteenth Amendment embraced all races, not simply
blacks. Cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (1gII) (dismissing from consideration in a
Thirteenth Amendment case the fact that the plaintiff in error was black); KENNETH M. STAmPP,
THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION 194 (1956) ("Some slaves were whites by any rational definition as
well as by all outward appearances . . ").
By claiming that § I of the Thirteenth Amendment embraces slaves of all races, we do not
necessarily endorse the Bailey Court's claim that race is utterly irrelevant in determining whether
"slavery" exists in a given context. Race may be especially relevant in determining which
"badges and incidents" of slavery Congress may abolish under § 2. See The Civil Rights Cases,
109 U.S. 3, 35-36 (x883) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
31 See The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) at 72.
32 1o9 U.S. 3 (1883).
33 The Civil Rights Cases, io9 U.S. at 20.
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principle has been repeatedly affirmed by the Supreme Court over the
last century. Consider, for example, Justice O'Connor's majority opin-
ion in United States v. Kozminski, 34 decided less than a year before
DeShaney:
[F]rom the general intent to prohibit conditions "akin to African slav-
ery," as well as the fact that the Thirteenth Amendment extends
beyond state action, we readily can deduce an intent to prohibit
compulsion through physical coercion . . . . [O]ur precedents clearly
define a Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of involuntary servitude
enforced by the use or threatened use of physical or legal
coercion. . . . [The amendment encompasses servitudes enforced] by
the use or threat of physical restraint or physical injury, or by the use
or threat of coercion through law or the legal process.35
The Kozminski Court also understood that the Amendment pro-
tects minors as well as adults. Thus, the Court discussed at length
an 1874 "Padrone Statute" designed to implement the Thirteenth
Amendment by preventing the enslavement of "young boys" 3 6 - en-
slavement that often took place with the consent of the boys' parents. 3 7
In one of the earliest and most important cases arising under the
Thirteenth Amendment, Chief Justice Salmon P. Chase on circuit
invalidated a coercive apprenticeship involving a ten-year-old girl, an
apprenticeship initially agreed to (though under suspicious circum-
stances) by the girl's mother.38
Finally, in a series of turn-of-the-century Thirteenth Amendment
decisions, the Court, even though presented with cases of forced labor,
declined in its dicta to so limit the reach of the Amendment. 39 In one
key case, the Court put forth an expansive dictionary definition of
slavery: "[1]n Webster slavery is defined as 'the state of entire subjec-
tion of one person to the will of another .... "',40 This definition
rightly transcends mere economics; although forced labor for economic
gain was one characteristic of slavery as practiced in the antebellum
South, forced labor itself does not exhaust the meaning of slavery.4 1
Primarily, it does not capture the power relationship of the master
over the slave - a system of dominance and degradation in which
34 487 U.S. 931 (1988).
31 Id. at 942, 944, 952 (emphasis added).
36 See id. at 947-48.
37 See, e.g., United States v. Ancarola, i F. 676, 68o, 683 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. i88o).
38 See In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 337, 340 (C.C.D. Md. x867) (No. 14,247); see also
Respublica v. Keppele, 2 Dall. 197, 199 (Pa. 1793) ("[N]o parent, under any circumstances, can
make his child a servant . . . .") (emphasis in original).
39 See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 241 (1911); Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. I,
17 (I9o6); Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 542 (1896).
40 Hodges, 203 U.S. at 17.
41 See ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH 99 (1982) ("There is nothing in
the nature of slavery which requires that the slave be a worker.").
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the master may treat the slave as a possession rather than as a
person. 42 Some slaves were so physically abused that they were un-
able to work. Clearly the Thirteenth Amendment did not exclude
these people from its protection simply because they served a sadistic
master - a Simon Legree - rather than a merely greedy master. 43
2. Antebellum Precedent. - That slavery was at root a power
relation, involving the domination of the master and the degradation
of the slave, was not lost on antebellum judges. In 1842, Judge Turley
of the Tennessee Supreme Court confirmed this interpretation of slav-
ery in Jacob v. State:4 4 "[T]he right to obedience and submission, in
all lawful things . . . , is perfect in the master . . . . ,4s Judge Ruffin
of the North Carolina Supreme Court described the master/slave re-
lationship in even blunter terms: "Such obedience [of a slave to a
master] is the consequence only of uncontrolled authority over the
body. . . . The power of the master must be absolute, to render the
submission of the slave perfect. '46 These judicial statements define
slavery without reference to forced labor or economic gain. A leading
antebellum anti-slavery tract similarly characterized slavery as an
institution of power, not profit: "We have seen that 'the legal relation'
of slave ownership, being the relation of an owner to his property,
invests him with unlimited power."47
In determining the status of a slave, antebellum courts took no
notice of a child's biological connection to the master. The law con-
sidered children of white masters and enslaved women to be the
property of their biological fathers. A leading abolitionist treatise
summarizing southern slaves codes explained:
In all these laws it is laid down that the child follows the condition
of the mother, whoever the father may be! The same usage, whether
with or without written law, prevails in all our slave States; and under
its sanction, the slave "owner" very frequently holds and sells his own
children as "property" .48
C. Slavery Through Slave Eyes
A definition of slavery under the Thirteenth Amendment should
also reflect how southern slaves interpreted their condition. Slave
42 See GENOVESE, supra note 2i, at 4 ("Theoretically, modern slavery rested . . . on the
idea of a slave as instrumentum vocale - a chattel, a possession, a thing, a mere extension of
his master's will."); STAMPP, supra note 3o, at 193 ("Legally, the slave was less a person than
a thing.").
43 See STAMPP, supra note 3o, at 182 (describing the "sadist ... Madame Lalaurie, of New
Orleans, who tortured her slaves for her own amusement").
44 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 493 (1842).
45 Id. at 520.
46 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 266 (1829).
47 WILLIAM GOODELL, THE AMERICAN SLAVE CODE 155 (Arno Press 1969) (2853) (emphasis
in original).
48 Id. at 248-49 (emphasis in original).
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diaries and oral histories provide insight into the evil that the Amend-
ment sought to eradicate. These narratives indicate that forced labor
was only one part of the slave's condition. The most common and
tragic story was the near-total proprietary power that a master wielded
over a slave.49 For example, former slave Allen V. Manning thought
that he had "belonged" to his master and "that I was his own chattel-
property and he could do with me like he wanted to . . .,,so0 Man-
ning's description of slavery closely corresponds to the descriptions
given by the antebellum judges. As property, a southern slave was
subject to the near-absolute control of another - control that at times
included the master's de facto power over life and death.51 For
example, Katie Rowe recalled her former master's chilling threats:
'Them Yankees ain't gwine git this far, but iffen they do, you all ain't
gwine git free by 'em, 'cause I gwine free you before that. When they
git here they gwine find you already free, 'cause I gwine line you up
on the bank of Bois d'Arc Creek and free you with my shotgun!'5 2
Even if a particular master cared for his slaves and refrained from
physically abusing them, the involuntary nature of slavery still re-
quired the implicit (and often explicit) threat of violence.
Many a slave received no solace or protection from the fact that
his master was, in fact, his biological father. As Frederick Douglass
reminded his many readers, the possibility that his master was his
biological father did not prevent his enslavement:
The whisper that my master was my father, may or may not be true;
and, true or false, it is of but little consequence to my purpose whilst
the fact remains in all its glaring odiousness, that slaveholders have
ordained, and by law established, that the children of slave women
shall in all cases follow the condition of their mothers .... 53
49 See JULIUS LESTER, To BE A SLAVE 28 (1968). To be sure, there were many cases of
slaves defending themselves against physical punishment. See, e.g., LAY MY BURDEN DOwN:
A FOLI" HISTORY OF SLAVERY 175 (Benjamin A. Botkin ed., 1945) [hereinafter LAY MY BURDEN
DOwN]. Nevertheless, slaves who attempted to defend themselves were forced into hiding or
flight to the North to avoid greater physical punishment. These sporadic outbursts of resistance
did not prevent slavery from being slavery.
So LAY MY BURDEN DOWN, supra note 49, at 93.
51 See DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE 57-58 (1966);
A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR 55-57, 188-90 (1978); JACOBUS
TENBROE, EQUAL UNDER LAW 124 & n.3 (1965). De jure, masters were typically free to rape
or assault slaves, but not to murder them. However, because of the gross imbalance of actual
power (the slaves' inability to testify, judicial deference to masters' disciplinary judgments, and
the like), murder prosecutions were quite rare. See STAMPP, supra note 30, at 217-24, 360.
52 LAY MY BURDEN DowN, supra note 49, at 103-04.
s3 FREDERICK DOUGLASS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS: AN AMER-
ICAN SLAVE 49 (Houston A. Baker, Jr., ed., 1982).
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The Thirteenth Amendment, which was undeniably adopted with
persons like Allen V. Manning, Katie Rowe, and Frederick Douglass
in mind, thus legitimately applies to any situation in which one person
is subject to another's near-absolute physical domination and degra-
dation - even if that other is his own biological father.54
D. The Abused Child as a Slave
The current status of abused children like Joshua DeShaney is thus
strikingly akin to the status of antebellum slaves like Frederick Doug-
lass. Although the precise form of their enslavement no doubt differed
in many ways, both Joshua DeShaney and Frederick Douglass were
essentially "slaves" - human beings treated as chattel and subject to
domination and degradation by their masters. Even the narrative
voice of today's abused children resembles the tone of nineteenth-
century slave narratives. As one abused child, Loretta, remembered
in words reminiscent of slave Katie Rowe's, "I was six or seven when
[Father] got out a big machete and said he was going to kill us all. "55
The legal analogy between southern slaves and abused children is also
evident. The laws of the southern states recognized the near-absolute
power of master over slave. Similarly, when child abuse rules are not
enforced, state custody law effectively grants parents absolute propri-
etary power to dominate and degrade their children. Before the Thir-
teenth Amendment, if a slave fled the master, the Constitution pro-
vided that any "Person held to Service or Labor in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall ... be delivered up on
Claim of the Party to who such Service or Labor may be due. '5 6
Today, a fugitive or runaway child will still "be delivered up" to the
custody of the parent, unless the state, in order to protect an abused
child, refuses to enforce its grant of parental custody.
54 The men and women who served as slaves understood that they were - quite literally
- treated as perpetual children, referred to by their first names only, or by the generic "boy"
and "girl." Indeed, Dean Miller has argued that the vision of "slave as child" has deep legal,
linguistic, and cultural roots in a vast number of slave regimes, including Greece, Rome,
Indonesia, China, Africa, and Iceland. See Dean A. Miller, Some Psycho-Social Perceptions of
Slavery, 18 J. Soc. HIST. 587, 588-89 (1985).
55 GREGGORY W. MORRIS, THE KIDS NEXT DOOR: SONS AND DAUGHTERS WHO KILL THEIR
PARENTS 26 (198S). An abused child typically sees no real alternative to parental custody. For
various reasons, few children come forward with allegations of physical abuse. One such reason
is fear; the parent threatens the child with more physical punishment if the child reveals the
abuse. In addition to fear, an abused child often does not want to harm the parent by telling.
An abused child suffering from continual humiliation and degradation might also feel that he
somehow deserves the punishment. Finally, a very young child often cannot understand what
is happening to him or communicate details about the abuse to others. Cf. United States v.
Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 947-48 (1988) (holding that the "victim's age or special vulnerability"
is relevant to an analysis of situational coercion).
56 U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
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III. FURTHER REFINEMENTS
A. The Competing Analogy: "Family" Versus "Slavery"
A definition of slavery as total control of one human being by
another 57 might, without further qualification or elaboration, seem to
"emancipate" all children from parental custody at birth. Yet, to some
extent, the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to protect black
families from being undermined and ripped asunder by slavery. One
of the justifications for abolition was the strengthening of family ties
- after emancipation, masters would no longer be able to thwart a
slave parent's control over (or even access to) her child by physically
separating them or, even more horrific, by breaking up the family on
the auction block.58 Republican Senator Henry Wilson of Massachu-
setts proclaimed:
[W]hen this amendment to the Constitution shall be consummated
. . . the sharp cry of the agonizing hearts of severed families will
cease to vex the weary ear of the nation .... Then the sacred rights
of human nature, the hallowed family relations of husband and wife,
parent and child, will be protected by the guardian spirit of that law
which make sacred alike the proud homes and lowly cabins of free-
dom. 5 9
Republican Congressman John A. Kasson of Iowa was even more
explicit in affirming that abolition would protect "the right of father
to his child - the parental relation." 60 There is no indication, how-
ever, that the Thirteenth Amendment was intended to maintain de
facto conditions of slavery within a nominal "family" or "parental"
structure.
i. Refining the Robertson Dictum. - The Supreme Court has
suggested that family relations are generally not within the scope of
the Thirteenth Amendment. In Robertson v. Baldwin,61 the Court
noted in passing that the Thirteenth Amendment was not intended to
s7 Of course, the careful reader will note that this crude definition of slavery differs in subtle
but important ways from the working definition we have embraced. See supra p. 1365.
53 As Republican Senator James Harlan of Iowa noted in the debate over the adoption of
the Thirteenth Amendment:
Another incident [of slavery] is the abolition practically of the parental relation, robbing
the offspring of the care and attention of his parents, severing a relation which is
universally cited as the emblem of the relation sustained by the Creator to the human
family. And yet, according to the matured judgment of these slave States, this guard-
ianship of the parent over his own children must be abrogated to secure the perpetuity
of slavery.
CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 1st Sess. 1439 (1864).
59 Id. at 1324. For similar statements, see CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., xst Sess. 504 (i866)
(statement of Sen. Howard); CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., ist Sess. 2990 (1864) (statement of
Sen. Ingersoll); and id. at 2955 (statement of Sen. Kellogg).
6) CONG. GLOBE, 3 8th Cong., 2d Sess. 193 (i865).
61 165 U.S. 275 (1897).
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apply to the "exceptional" case of "the right of parents and guardians
to the custody of their minor children or wards. '62 This right, the
Court implied, was well established at the time of the Thirteenth
Amendment, and was not meant to be eliminated by the Amendment.
Yet surely it goes too far to exempt all "parental" relations from
Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny, for such a categorical exemption
would have allowed many white men in 1865 to continue to enslave
their mulatto offspring simply by calling themselves "fathers" rather
than "masters." Surely the Amendment applied to a true slave child
- a young Frederick Douglass - even if the slave's master was also
his father.
But how can we recognize the true slave child, as distinct from
the free child? As Robertson reminds us, unlike a free adult, a free
child is customarily subject to the custody, control, and guardianship
of another. This distinction, however, does not support a categorical
exemption for child custody cases; such an exemption would imply,
contrary to both case law63 and common sense, that no distinction
exists between a free child and a slave child, and that the Amendment
is thus inapplicable to children. Instead, the Robertson insight must
be refined into a doctrinal test that looks beyond custody per se - a
test tailored to mark the subtle but all-important line between freedom
and slavery in the specific case of children.
Although the Robertson dictum rested on immemorial custom,
custom alone cannot be the sole test of the Thirteenth Amendment's
meaning, because the Amendment was designed to challenge long-
standing institutions and practices that violated its core values of
personhood and dignity. Any exception to the Amendment's reach
must be limited to those historic practices that are consistent with the
Amendment's central thrust. With this caveat in mind, we must
remember that the custodial right of parents invoked by the Robertson
Court was itself a limited right. At the time of the Thirteenth Amend-
ment, "the right of parents ... to the custody of their minor children"
was limited by child abuse laws; a parent could be held criminally
liable for unduly harsh physical punishment. 64
62 Id. at 282.
63 See supra p. 1369.
64 See, e.g., Neal v. State, 54 Ga. 281, 282 (1875) (holding that a father's use of a saw to
whip a ten year old girl was "cruel and outrageous abuse of the parental authority" and actionable
as criminal assault); Fletcher v. People, 52 Ill. 395, 396-97 (I869) (upholding a parent's false
imprisonment conviction for "shocking inhumanity," "needless cruelty," and the "wanton im-
prisonment ... of a blind and helpless boy" and holding that "inhuman beating" is criminally
actionable); State v. Bitman, i3 Iowa 485, 486 (1862) (holding that a father's "inhuman[]
whipping and beating [of] his own child" was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of assault
and battery); State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263, 265-66 (1829) (noting that a parent could
be charged with unduly harsh physical punishment of his child); Commonwealth v. Blaker, i
Brewster 311 (Phila. County Ct. 1867) (holding that "excessive" parental punishment was ac-
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Indeed, protection against such abuse was precisely one of the
markers that distinguished the free child from the slave. In 1829,
North Carolina Supreme Court Judge Ruffin responded as follows to
the claim that in extreme cases of abuse, a master could be charged
with battery upon a slave, just as a parent could be charged with
unduly cruel abuse of a child: "There is no likeness between the
cases. . . The difference is that which exists between freedom and
slavery . ".. .,65 Throughout the antebellum era, a key legal distinc-
tion between "slaves" and free "apprentices" (whose masters exercised
powers in loco parentis) was that free apprentices could not be beaten
at will. 66  Consider also the language of the Illinois Supreme Court
in 1870:
[T]he power of the parent must be exercised with moderation. He
may use correction and restraint, but in a reasonable manner. He has
the right to enforce only such discipline, as may be necessary to the
discharge of his sacred trust; only moderate correction and temporary
confinement. . . [In Rome, the law] gave fathers the power of life
and death, and of sale, over their children. In this age and country,
such provisions would be atrocious. 67
Therefore, it was not well established at the time of the Amendment
that a parent could severely abuse a free child.
Courts have long conditioned a parent's right to custody of a free
child on the interests of the child. As Justice Story observed in the
1824 case of United States v. Green,68 parents do not have an absolute
"property" right69 to the custody of free children:
tionable as assault and battery); Johnson v. State, 21 Tenn. (2 Hum.) 283 (1840) (declaring, in
a decision around 1837, that "cruel and merciless punishment" by parents was a criminal act
and reserving for the jury the question of whether tying a daughter to a bedpost for hours and
whipping her with cowskin at regular intervals - in addition to other beatings - violated the
legal standard). The above cited material, drawn from a variety of American jurisdictions,
stands in some tension with the suggestion that "'[t]he first state intervention to protect a child
from parental abuse occurred in 1874.'" JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY LAv 1182 (2d ed. 1985)
(quoting Judith Areen, Intervention Between Parent and Child: A Reappraisal of the State's
Role in Child Abuse and Neglect Cases, 63 GEO. L.J. 887, 903 (1975)). But cf. Areen, supra,
at 900 & n.77 (noting briefly Johnson and Fletcher).
For a general discussion of this topic, see WALTER C. TIFFANY, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW
OF PERSONS AND DOMESTIc RELATIONS 243-46 (1896). Even if child abuse laws were not
vigorously enforced in the pre-Civil War period, it is evident from these cases that a parent's
legal right to custody was not unconditional.
65 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) at 265 (emphasis added); see also STAMPP, supra note
3o, at 186 (noting that by the mid-nineteenth century, the lash was considered too "cruel" for
the punishment of "free men," but was still commonly used on slaves).
66 See Lea S. VanderVelde, The Labor Vision of the Thirteenth Amendment, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 437, 442 (1989).
67 People ex rel. O'Connell v. Turner, 55 Ill. 280, 285 (1870).
6s 26 F. Cas. 30 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824) (No. 15,256).
69 See generally Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family History and Family Law, 1985 Wis. L. REV.
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When, therefore, the court is asked to lend its aid to put the infant
into the custody of the father . . . it will look into all the circum-
stances, and ascertain whether it will be for the real, permanent
interests of the infant . . . . It is an entire mistake to suppose the
court is at all events bound to deliver over the infant to his father, or
that the latter has an absolute vested right in the custody. 70
A parent's control over a free child is more akin to trusteeship
than title: parental custody is justified only if such custody is plausibly
in the interests of the child. Thus, we can recast the insight of the
Robertson dictum as follows: the Thirteenth Amendment does not
invalidate parents' discipline and control over children in ordinary
circumstances because family control is in the children's interest.71
Because minors often lack the ability to make fully informed and
autonomous decisions on their own behalf, we cannot simply look to
their subjective will to determine whether a servitude is "involuntary"
and thus violative of the Amendment. By necessity we must fashion
a less subjective test, focusing instead on whether custody over a child
looks more like the "family" system the Amendment was designed to
protect, or the "slavery" system it was designed to prohibit. 72 As we
have seen, biology alone cannot distinguish "family" from "slavery"
- nor can race, birthdate, or legitimacy. If a slave child named
Joshua Frederick Douglass had been born in i86o as the mulatto
offspring of white father Randy and a black slave mother, it would
be easy for us to see cruel and purposeless beatings of Joshua as
emblematic of the evils of slavery. But why should it matter that the
real Joshua was born not in i86o, but in 1979? Or that he was
presumably not mulatto, but white?73 Or that he was not "illegiti-
mate" at birth? Or that his master called him "son" or that he did
not have the middle and last names "Frederick Douglass"? A slave
by any other name is still a slave. 74 When custody ceases to be
plausibly in the interests of the child, it looks more like title than
trusteeship, and thus more like true "slavery" than true 'family."
1135, 1156-57 (recounting the move to the "best interests" test); Jamil S. Zainaldin, The Emer-
gence of a Modern American Family Law: Child Custody, Adoption, and the Courts, 1796-185r,
73 Nw. U. L. REV. 1038, 1072-74 (1979) (same).
70 Green, 26 F. Cas. at 31-32; see also JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERIcAN LAW
205 (x873) (discussing the power of the state to remove a child from parental custody).
71 See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEFORE THE BEST
INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 3-14 (1979) (explaining the importance of the family structure for
child development).
72 See supra p. 1373.
73 Cf. Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 231 (i911) (dismissing from consideration in a
Thirteenth Amendment case the fact that the plaintiff in error was black).
74 For an analysis of other possible distinctions between Joshua DeShaney and Joshua
Frederick Douglass, see infra pp. 1378-82.
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To put this point as a textual argument, the Amendment prohibits
both "involuntary servitude" and "slavery" - whether "voluntary" or
not. In the case of an adult held against her will, even if her master's
daily treatment of her is not overtly abusive, her servitude is none-
theless involuntary and therefore prohibited.75 In the case of minors,
however, we should focus less on "involuntary servitude" and more
on "slavery," which in this context is usefully understood as domina-
tion and degradation not plausibly for the benefit of the child. When
the child's interests are utterly disregarded, the child is in effect being
treated as a possession, as a chattel - as a slave - rather than as a
"free" person with interests (even if not a fully formed will) of her
own, interests worthy of respect. In extraordinary circumstances of
severe physical abuse, parental custody rights cannot be justified as
serving the child's interests. This was evident in Joshua's case. 76
2. Where to Draw the Line? - The state must have a mechanism
to distinguish between those custody relationships that appear to serve
the child's interest and those that plainly do not - that is, between
legitimate ("family") and illegitimate ("slavery") forms of parental con-
trol. Thus, the Thirteenth Amendment requires the state to have and
to enforce child abuse laws; these laws are constitutionally compelled.
Certainly, there is a continuum between permissible and mandatory
state intervention. For example, the state is not compelled to termi-
nate parental custody in every instance of physical punishment. How-
ever, at some point, the state has a constitutional obligation to protect
the child. Clearly, this point is reached in cases like Joshua's involving
a pattern of extreme abuse.
Most states have already approximated this point of mandatory
intervention in laws that define what kinds of parental misconduct
and child abuse justify criminal punishment. 77 In DeShaney, for
75 What is more, if a servitude is truly involuntary, any daily kindness within the servitude
exists only in the shadow of the violence and/or legal coercion that would occur if the servant
attempted to escape or end the servitude. See supra p. 1371.
76 Legitimate parental discipline and control may include requiring a child to work at home
(for example, chores) or in the market (for example, a newspaper route). As we have already
noted, the Thirteenth Amendment doctrine of voluntarism, which is applicable to competent
adults, does not automatically apply to minors. See supra p. 1376. But the personhood principle
underlying the Thirteenth Amendment does apply. At some point, severe physical punishments
for shirking, or outrageous demands for child labor (especially where the labor directly benefits
the parent) cease to be plausibly in the child's interest, and clearly constitute child abuse
prohibited by the Thirteenth Amendment. For early applications of the Amendment in the
context of forced child labor (parental complicity notwithstanding), see supra notes 36-38 and
accompanying text.
77 We focus here on the substantive standard of conduct, and not on the standard of proof
(for example, the "preponderance of the evidence" standard versus the "beyond a reasonable
doubt" standard). With respect to the standard of proof, criminal rules seem inappropriate for
civil child abuse cases under the Thirteenth Amendment. In those cases, we propose that the
same standards of proof applicable to other civil Thirteenth Amendment cases - peonage cases,
and the like - should apply.
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example, the Supreme Court was well aware that Wisconsin had in
fact convicted Randy DeShaney for criminal child abuse. 73 In short,
although the Thirteenth Amendment requires legal line-drawing to
distinguish legitimate "family" from illegitimate "slavery, ' 79 similar
lines have already been drawn, and are enforced daily in our criminal
codes that define child abuse. Thus, a court looking to fashion jus-
ticiable Thirteenth Amendment standards has a helpful array of ex-
isting laws from which to choose.80
B. The Formalist Disanalogy
Are there any relevant differences between the real Joshua De-
Shaney and the fictional slave child Joshua Frederick Douglass? Once
we get beyond the superficially striking but legally irrelevant differ-
ences of race, birthdate, and legitimacy, only two major differences
remain. 8 ' First, Joshua Frederick Douglass could be sold by his
abusive biological father to another, but Joshua DeShaney could not.
Yet as we have already seen, power, domination, and dehumanization
are the essence of slavery. Vulnerability to sale is simply one contin-
gent capitalist attribute of the master's near-absolute power over the
slave. In a non-capitalist regime, lords might not be permitted to sell
their serfs, but that would hardly mean that the system was not a
form of slavery. Even if he could not be sold, Joshua was treated
not as a person, but as a chattel, as a thing, as - quite literally -
a punching bag. Under these circumstances, had Randy been allowed
to sell custody over Joshua to someone willing to protect Joshua's
78 See DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189, 193 (1989).
79 In the employment/peonage context, similar line-drawing is necessary to mark the subtle
but all-important border between freedom and slavery - between the free labor system the
Amendment seeks to protect and the forced labor system it seeks to prohibit.
Even if the particular line we propose in the child abuse context were for some reason
unacceptable, our larger argument would remain; some line must be drawn between slavery
and freedom, and any line that categorically exempts minors, biological offspring, legal wards,
or noneconomic forms of slavery from Thirteenth Amendment scrutiny would betray the letter
and spirit of that Amendment.
80 In cases where parental enslavement of children takes the form of economic exploitation
rather than brute physical abuse, see supra note 76, truancy and child labor statutes may be
more relevant than child abuse statutes per se for fashioning justiciable standards. Of course,
courts in Thirteenth Amendment cases need not accept future changes - motivated by a state's
desire to avoid liability - to these standards; past laws may be a better baseline in helping
judges to strike the proper Thirteenth Amendment balance.
31 In addition to the distinctions noted in the text, it might be argued that Joshua DeShaney's
enslavement was only temporary; upon reaching adulthood, at least, Joshua would be freed.
But that would hardly mean that Joshua was never enslaved in the first place. The fictional
Joshua Frederick Douglass would have been emancipated in x865, and the real Frederick
Douglass escaped in his early twenties, but they too were slave children until emancipated. In
any case, the Thirteenth Amendment prohibits even temporary slavery and involuntary servi-
tude, as the Turner and "Padrone Statute" cases - involving children who would have been
freed upon reaching maturity - make clear. See supra p. 1369.
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interests - say, his mother - such a sale would have looked more
like emancipation than like slavery.8 2
Second, the fictional Joshua Frederick Douglass suffered lawful
beatings at the hands of his biological father, whereas the beatings
endured by the nominally free Joshua DeShaney were committed
unlawfully. A formalist defender of the DeShaney holding might
argue that this difference is dispositive; Wisconsin should not be held
legally liable for Joshua's injuries because the state did, after all, place
formal limits on Randy's custodial rights over Joshua. As with race,
birthdate, legitimacy, and marketability, however, this formalist dis-
tinction is less weighty than might first appear.
The formalist defense of DeShaney begins on solid ground by
emphasizing the fundamental difference between a regime where se-
vere physical abuse of a child is lawful and a regime where such
conduct is prohibited. Indeed, as argued above, this difference - not
biology - is a critical dividing line between "family" law and "slavery"
' law. But the formalist errs in focusing only on "law on the books"
rather than "law in action." The Thirteenth Amendment is concerned
not only with the purity of state statute books, but also with the
reality of freedom in America. To reiterate the central dictum of the
Civil Rights Cases: "The amendment is not a mere prohibition of state
laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute declaration
that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the
United States."8 3 Or as the Court put the point in a later case, the
Amendment "denounces a status or condition, irrespective of the man-
ner or authority by which it is created. "S4
Even the Fourteenth Amendment, built around an explicit state
action requirement, focuses on "law in action." As the Court held
early on, laws that were unassailable as written on the statute books
would, if improperly applied in practice, violate the Fourteenth
Amendment.85 The concern with de facto abuse of power is even
more prominent in the Thirteenth Amendment, which lacks a state
action trigger.
Thus, Kozminski and a long line of earlier cases make clear that
the Thirteenth Amendment applies even when a private party, in
violation of law, uses brute physical force to enslave another and hold
82 See STAMPP, supra note 30, at 97, 194 (describing the de facto and de jure emancipation
accomplished by the parental ransoming of slave children). Vulnerability to sale is simply a
surface symptom - a marker - of the essential evil of slavery: the treatment of a human being
as a thing, not as a person. Just as true slavery can exist without this marker, so can the
marker exist without true slavery, as the concept of ransom illustrates.
3 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
84 Clyatt v. United States, 197 U.S. 207, 216 (i9o5).
85 See, e.g., Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 287 (913); Yick
Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 373-74 (1886); Ex parte Virginia, 1oo U.S. 339, 346-47 (188o);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313, 321 (18o). For an even earlier statement, see United States
v. Given, 25 F. Cas. 1324, 1327 (C.C.D. Del. 1873) (No. 15,210) (Strong, J.).
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her in bondage.8 6 To vindicate the central command of the Amend-
ment, the enslaved person must have legal redress against the master.
Historically, this redress has typically taken the form of common law
remedies, including the great prospective anti-slavery writs of habeas
corpus and personal replevin (the same writs used in many nineteenth-
century child custody cases)8 7 and the retrospective remedy of damage
suits for wrongful imprisonment, trespass, and the like.88 If a state
were ever to repeal these common law remedies, the Thirteenth
Amendment would itself provide the basis for both prospective and
retrospective redress, under the well established constitutional prin-
ciples laid down in Ex parte Young89 and Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Federal Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics.90
Thus far, it might seem as -if the Amendment creates a legal duty
only on the part of the private master, and not the state. Such an
analysis overlooks the fact that the very idea of a private legal duty
logically entails a governmental system to enforce that legal duty. A
state must, for example, provide courts open to hear the required suits
against masters. Hence, the broad command that slavery shall not
exist does more than impose an absolute duty on private would-be
enslavers; it also imposes a duty on the state to provide an adequate
apparatus to enforce the emancipation of all persons within its juris-
diction. 91 A state has considerable flexibility in discharging this ob-
ligation - for example, criminal punishment of enslavers is not con-
stitutionally compelled - but the state may not simply turn a blind
eye to slavery within its jurisdiction.
86 See supra pp. 1368-70.
87 See Zainaldin, supra note 69, at 1052-68.
88 See, e.g., In re Turner, 24 F. Cas. 337, 339-40 (C.C.D. Md. 1867) (No. 14,247) (Chase,
C.J.) (holding that the Thirteenth Amendment was self-executing and applicable in a habeas
action where a private master sought to hold a young girl captive in violation of state and
federal statutes).
89 See 209 U.S. 123, 155-56 (89o8).
90 See 403 U.S. 388, 392 (1971).
91 For broad historical support underlying this reading of the Thirteenth Amendment, see
TENBROEK, supra note 5r, at 157-97. See also i866 CONG. GLOBE, 3 9 th Cong., ist Sess. 41
(statement of Sen. Sherman) ("To say that a man is a freeman and yet is not able to assert his
right, in a court of justice, is a negation of terms."); I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *412
("[T]he law of England abhors, and will not endure the existence, of slavery within this nation
... [A] slave or negro, the instant he lands in England, becomes a freeman; that is, the law
will protect him in the enjoyment of his person ... .") (emphasis added); Howard J. Graham,
The Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment (pt. 2), 195o WIs. L. REv.
6io, 628 ("'If the least attempt is made to enslave a white person of any description, he or she
can apply to the Law for redress, and have full and ample relief by due course of Law ...
What abolitionists demand as naked justice is, that the benefit and protection of these just laws,
be extended to all human beings alike . . . .'" (quoting CHARLES OLCOTr, Two LECTURES ON
THE SUBJECT OF SLAVERY, AND ABOLITION 44 (1838))); Graham, supra, at 656-57 (quoting
PHILANTHROPIST, Jan. 27, 1837, at 3) (describing an unknown abolitionist's stance on the
"obligation" of judges to entertain habeas petitions from, or on behalf of, slaves).
138o [WoL 105:1359
CHILD ABUSE AS SLAVERY
If, for example, ex-masters in 1870 had formed a Kidnapping
Klub, rounding up and enslaving free blacks, a state court would not
have been free to simply disregard habeas writs brought by or on
behalf of the re-enslaved. Nor is the duty to eradicate slavery within
their jurisdiction a duty limited to judges, for the Thirteenth Amend-
ment speaks to all state officials. Because of the very nature of slavery
and bondage, not all slaves may be in a position to appear in court
on their own. Therefore, if other agents of the state, without any
justification whatsoever, knowingly allowed a Kidnapping Klub to
continue, their actions also would violate the Amendment's command
that slavery shall not exist. The lesson of the judge sitting in habeas
court is generalizable: once any arm of the state knows of present,
identifiable slavery within its territory, the state must take reasonable
steps to end the enslavement.92 Thus, the absence of a state action
requirement in the Thirteenth Amendment means not only that certain
private action is banned, but also that certain state inaction is pro-
hibited. The two points are closely linked: precisely because the
Amendment imposes a legal duty on private masters, it simultaneously
requires the state to enforce that legal duty. Put another way, the
Amendment requires state action under certain circumstances.
The idea that certain clauses of the Constitution require govern-
ment action - even the expenditure of government funds -is neither
outlandish nor counterstructural. For example, Article I, Section 2
requires a decennial census93 and a biennial congressional election. 94
Censuses and elections require government action and the expenditure
of government funds. Yet once we recognize that the Constitution
requires the government to act to ensure democracy, what stops us
from seeing that the document similarly requires government action
to ensure freedom?
In light of the foregoing analysis, Wisconsin's dereliction of its
Thirteenth Amendment duty in DeShaney is clear. Despite its knowl-
edge of Joshua's victimization, the state turned a blind eye to de facto
slavery within its jurisdiction and violated the Amendment just as
much as if its judges had simply ignored habeas writs filed on Joshua's
behalf. 95 As the Kidnapping Kiub hypothetical makes clear, the state
92 We thus derive this duty from the core of the Thirteenth Amendment's self-executing
command: the habeas judge must act on petitions brought before the court. See supra p. 1380.
By emphasizing this core, we do not mean to suggest that § i of the Amendment cannot radiate
further, or that Congress, acting under § 2, cannot legitimately impose duties beyond this core.
We merely emphasize this core duty to address squarely the "slippery slope" and "boundless
duty" criticisms that are often invoked against claims of so-called "affirmative" rights.
93 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3.
94 See id. at cI. i.
95 As noted earlier, the core of the Thirteenth Amendment is the duty of the state to provide
habeas and analogous relief. See supra note 92. Wisconsin's subsequent criminal prosecution
of Randy in no way makes up for the state's earlier refusal to protect Joshua through civil
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must do more than simply put words on paper to prohibit kidnapping,
child abuse, and other forms of enslavement within its borders. The
Thirteenth Amendment is not satisfied by a state that willfully sees
no evil and hears no evil, even if its paper laws speak no evil. Under
the principles of Bivens96 and 42 U.S.C § 1983, 9 7 state officials can
and should be held liable for the violation of their constitutional
duties. 98
remedies akin to habeas; the central demand of the Amendment is freedom and personhood for
Joshua, not imprisonment of Randy.
96 See 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971).
97 This section of the United States Code specifically encompasses state conduct that either
subjects a citizen or "causes [him] to be subjected" to a deprivation of constitutional rights. See
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (x988) (emphasis added).
98 In any event, the case for state liability on the facts of DeShaney is even stronger than
in the Kidnapping Klub hypothetical. Wisconsin was not merely an innocent bystander in
DeShaney. The state affirmatively took sides by enforcing master Randy's parental servitude
and recognizing his legal custody rights. Unlike the Kidnapping Klub, Randy held his slave
under the color of state custody law.
The formalist is correct to note that Wisconsin state custody law formally prohibits child
abuse, but it is far from clear why this fact should absolve the state of all responsibility. Unlike
its relationship to Kidnappers acting wholly outside the law, the state in DeShaney gave Randy
special legal powers - a servitude of sorts - over Joshua. Because Wisconsin put Randy in
a special position of vast power and discretion over Joshua, it should be held responsible for
Randy's abuse of that power. Such, indeed, is the general rule in American constitutional law.
If a state creates a police officer and vests him with vast power and discretion over ordinary
citizens, the state is responsible whenever the officer exercises that power under color of law -
even if the officer's conduct transgresses formal state rules, and even if the officer is later
criminally prosecuted for his abuse of power. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 (I96i);
Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. i, ii (1944); supra note 85. If Wisconsin can properly be held
liable for a police officer - call him Officer Randy - who abuses his state-created police power
to violate constitutional rights of citizens, why should Wisconsin not also be held liable when
father Randy abuses his state-created custody power to violate Joshua's constitutional right not
to be a slave?
One possible response is that the DeShaney Court implicitly rejected the notion that state
custody law could be viewed as state action. This answer overreads DeShaney, however, for
the Court there held only that the facts did not present sufficient state action to trigger sub-
stantive due process analysis, see DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 195, 202. The Court's reluctance to
find state action might have been a result of its desire to limit the scope of substantive due
process; both the Court and commentators in recent years have expressed grave concerns about
the legitimacy of this doctrine because of its tarnished textual and historical pedigree, its
apparently unbounded scope, its ability to transform the Court into a superlegislature, and the
like. In light of these legitimate concerns, the DeShaney Court might well have used a stiffer
state action trigger than would be appropriate in other contexts in which the unique concerns
raised by the substantive due process doctrine do not apply. By contrast with substantive due
process doctrine, the Thirteenth Amendment is textually and historically grounded, conceptually
bounded, and consistent with democratic ideals. Thus, a less stringent state action trigger may
be appropriate here - especially in light of the Amendment's unique rejection of state action
principles underlying other parts of the Constitution. Cf. JOHN H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 19-20 (1980) (arguing that the Court's anxiety over the substantive due process
doctrine might have led to the stiffening of the "life, liberty, or property" trigger).
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C. The Slave Analogy Reconsidered
The characterization of Joshua DeShaney as a "slave child" and
the analogy to the hypothetical Joshua Frederick Douglass may strike
some critics as more clever than clarifying, more contrived than com-
pelling. Such criticism, however, misses the deep resonance between
the facts of DeShaney and the vision of the Thirteenth Amendment.
The Amendment is not linked to DeShaney in some fanciful or far-
fetched way; rather, the Amendment powerfully combines and orga-
nizes the best moral and analytic objections to the Rehnquist Court's
result in DeShaney.
For those who consider the violence and cruelty of child abuse a
moral abomination, 99 the moral fervor underlying the Thirteenth
Amendment is one of the Constitution's best sources of inspiration
and illumination. For those who seek to vindicate substantive rights
to real world protection,100 few provisions of the Constitution are as
substantive or realist - concerned with de facto power - as the
Thirteenth Amendment. For those who want to break down rigid
distinctions between "affirmative" and "negative" rights, between state
"action" and "inaction," 10 1 few provisions hold more promise than an
Amendment that has as its hallmark the absence of a state action
trigger. For those who believe that the politically and economically
powerless - the "little ones," the "discrete and insular," the "worst-
off class" - deserve special constitutional solicitude, 02 the "slave[s]
and "serv[ants]" at the heart of the Thirteenth Amendment should be
emblematic. For those who, following early twentieth-century Pro-
gressives, seek to destroy the myth that common law baselines are
natural and pre-political, and who seek to interrogate the status
quo,' 0 3 the Thirteenth Amendment should loom large: how can we
forget the radical redefinition - indeed, the redistribution - of prop-
erty that Emancipation effected? For those who, following more re-
cent Feminists, seek to remind us that biology is neither destiny nor
automatic protection 0 4 - that traditional family roles are not God-
given, and may mask oppression - the stories of Frederick Douglass
and his enslaved sisters are powerfully confirmatory.
99 See, e.g., Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and the "Free World" of DeShaney,
57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1514-16 (i989).
100 See, e.g., Steven J. Heyman, The First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the
Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE L.J. 301, 301-02 (1991).
101 See, e.g., Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MIcH. L. REv. 2271,
2278-87 (1990).
102 See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Administrative Failure and Local Democracy: The Politics
of DeShaney, 199o DuKF, L.J. 1078, 1078-79, 1087-94.
103 See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 9, at 53-54, 64-66.
104 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665, I665-66, 1687-89 (1990).
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Thus far, we have focused on how the Amendment illuminates the
facts of DeShaney, but this point can be inverted to show how the
facts of DeShaney illuminate the Amendment. In other words, child
abuse is not some peripheral application of the Amendment, but lies
close to its core. The central concern of the Amendment is not labor,
not adulthood, not blackness, not state action, not biology, but slavery
- a system of dominance and subservience, often on a personal scale,
and the reduction of human beings to the status of things. In today's
world, this central concern is far better embodied in the plight of
abused children, than say, in Hollywood actors trying to avoid specific
performance of personal service contracts.10 5
In light of all this, the real question is not whether the links
between DeShaney and the Thirteenth Amendment are contrived, but
how so many of us could overlook the obvious linkages.' 0 6
IV. CHOOSING THE RIGHT CLAUSE
In their suit against Wisconsin, the attorneys for Joshua relied
wholly upon the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Notwithstanding the strength of the due process claim itself, 10 7 such
reliance may have been misplaced. Like gin, the due process clause
has been used to combat any and every malady.'08 As we have seen,
many of the Rehnquist Court Justices have perfectly sensible and
principled reasons to be skeptical of claims wrapped in the language
of substantive due process.' 0 9 For two reasons, we believe that the
Thirteenth Amendment approach ultimately holds more promise.
105 The Amendment is regularly invoked in connection with the proposition that personal
service contracts are generally not enforceable by injunction. See Goldsmith v. Pyramid Com-
munications, Inc., 362 F. Supp. 694, 698 (I973); American Broadcasting Co. v. Wolf, 420
N.E.2d 363, 366 (N.Y. 1981); JOHN D. CALAIARI & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, THE LAW OF
CONTRACTS 666 (3d ed. x987).
106 Race and sex blinders might be partly responsible for this oversight. Because of the
Thirteenth Amendment's special association with the liberation of blacks, mainstream consti-
tutionalists may have overlooked it as a source of universal generative principles. The dominant
subconscious sees the Amendment as black, and Wisconsin as white, and so it misses the
connection between Frederick Douglass and Joshua DeShaney. Subconscious sexism may also
have infected the mainstream analysis. On the rare occasions when the mainstream does focus
on slavery, it tends to think about slave men more than slave women. Consequently, it
downplays the system of polygamous concubinage within slavery and represses the intimate ties
of sex and blood linking masters and slaves. Specialization of academic labor might also be a
factor. Because constitutional law and family law fall on different sides of the "public" law/
"private" law divide, they are studied by different sets of scholars. The Thirteenth Amendment
tends to fall between the cracks.
107 See supra pp. 1361-63.
10s See CHARLES BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
33 (i969).
109 See supra p. 1363 and note 98.
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First, a plaintiff's story is most compelling when cast in terms of
the constitutional provision that best captures the victim's plight. In
Joshua's case, this provision is not the overworked and abstract lan-
guage of due process, but the more evocative words of the Thirteenth
Amendment. The story of Joshua DeShaney recalls the stories nar-
rated by those slaves whose plight gave rise to the Amendment.
Joshua was held by his father in a condition of slavery as brutal,
cruel, degrading, and dehumanizing as the slavery practiced in the
antebellum South. This is the insight suggested, but not developed,
by Justice Blackmun's passionate and compassionate language, and
his invocation of fugitive slaves. 110 The state of Wisconsin can be
understood as enforcing this servitude by rendering Joshua to his
father, just as slaves were rendered to their masters. This is the
insight again only suggested by Justice Brennan's description of Wis-
consin's confinement of Joshua within the four walls of his father's
home. 111
Second, the Thirteenth Amendment, by its very spirit, specificity,
limitations, and tight connection to the facts concerning Joshua De-
Shaney, counters charges of judicial activism and fears of slippery
slopes. Relief for Joshua under the Thirteenth Amendment would not
require that victims of random street crime, for example, be given a
cause of action against the state. The application of the Thirteenth
Amendment is necessarily bounded by its specific textual requirements
- "slavery" or "involuntary servitude." This is the response to the
DeShaney majority's concern about unbounded substantive due pro-
cess and Judge Posner's parade of horribles once "affirmative consti-
tutional rights" are recognized. 112
Joshua's brutal mistreatment is better illustrated and addressed by
the Thirteenth Amendment than by the Due Process Clause. Because
this anti-slavery Amendment captures the full horror of Joshua's plight
and blunts the judicial parade of horribles raised to deny Joshua relief,
it offers the most appropriate constitutional vehicle for future Joshuas.
110 See supra p. 1363.
M1 See supra p. 1362.
112 Nevertheless, the Thirteenth Amendment may have applications not previously or only
recently explored. For example, the Amendment may provide a cause of action for battered
wives who are unprotected by the state. We reserve this issue for separate analysis - it
implicates adults, not minors, and may not involve the same kind of state-created custody at
issue in DeShaney. And for an analysis of the non-justiciable implications of the Thirteenth
Amendment for minimal entitlements to education and the like, see Akhil R. Amar, Forty Acres
and a Mule: A Republican Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 37,
40-43 (1990).
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